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THE LEGAL FUTURE OF "REALITY" COP SHOWS: PARKER v.
BOYER DISMISSES § 1983 CLAIMS AGAINST POLICE
OFFICERS AND TELEVISION STATIONS
JOINTLY ENGAGED IN SEARCHES
OF HOMES
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, television viewers have maintained an appetite
for police action on TV, tuning into police dramas, fact-based televi-
sion movies and most recently, "reality" programs featuring actual
police officers on duty.' In 1992, "reality" and "reality-based" 2
shows achieved high ratings while fictional cop shows declined in
popularity.3 By 1995, fifteen reality or reality-based programs were
1. See Richard Zoglin, The Cops and the Cameras, TIME, Apr. 6, 1992, at 62
(describing television industry's historical fondness for police action).
2. Some authors have used the terms "reality" and "reality-based" interchange-
ably to refer to shows featuring either actual footage of real police officers on duty
or re-enactments of police stories. See, e.g., Kevin Goldman, CBS Is Shuffling Its TV
Schedule After Three Weeks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1990, at B6 (describing "Top Cops"
program, featuring police re-enactments, as "reality program" and subsequently as
"reality-based" show). Other authors use the terms "reality" or "reality-based" only
to refer to programs featuring actual police officers on duty. See, e.g., Howard
Kurtz, Hidden Network Cameras: A Troubling Trend? Critics Complain of Deception as
Dramatic Footage Yields High Ratings, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1992, at Al (referring to
"Street Stories" and "COPS" programs which feature actual footage of police activ-
ity as examples of "reality-based" shows). A third group of authors distinguishes
the two terms, using "reality" to refer to programs featuring actual footage of real
police officers, and "reality-based" to refer to programs that recreate incidents us-
ing actors rather than broadcasting video footage of actual police operations. See,
e.g., Kevin E. Lunday, Permitting Media Participation in Federal Searches: Exploring the
Consequences for the United States Following Ayeni v. Mottola and a Framework for Analy-
sis, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 278, 308 nn.3 & 5 (1997) (defining "reality" television as
programs featuring actual video footage of police during performance of their
duties and "reality-based" programs as programs that recreate police incidents with
actors).
For purposes of this Note, the term "reality" will be used to refer to programs
featuring footage of actual law enforcement officers on duty. The term "reality-
based" will be reserved for programs showing recreations of police operations.
3. See Zoglin, supra note 1, at 62. Many sources believe that the success of
reality programs is attributed to their graphic content which satisfies the public's
hunger for violence. See, e.g., Erica Goode & Katia Hetter, The Selling of Reality, A
Hot Tale and a Good Agent Can Buy Fame and Fortune. But at What Cost?, U.S. NEws &
WoRLD REP., July 25, 1994, at 4956 (quoting police chief's opinion that reality pro-
grams only depict portion of policing that satiates public's hunger for violence). A
significant number of viewers believe that the violent content of reality programs is
excessive. See Monika Guttman, A Kinder, Gentler Hollywood Violence in Entertainment;
The Industry Pulls Its Punches amid a Growing Public Outcry About How Make-Believe
Violence Affects Real Life, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., May 9, 1994, at 3844 (noting that
(481)
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slated for broadcasting, including at least three focusing entirely on
crime fighting.4 While most of the public watches reality program-
ming for its entertainment value, others support reality programs
like the Fox Network's "COPS" for the positive effects the programs
have on law enforcement. 5
Despite the overall success of reality and reality-based pro-
grams, some networks have reduced the number of reality and real-
ity-based programs they broadcast. 6 Faced with intense
competition from other networks, a few broadcasters have chosen
to cancel their reality programs. 7 Other networks have cut their
reality programs in response to public protests against violence on
one third of respondents surveyed listed local TV news and reality shows, like Fox
Network's "COPS", as serious concerns in violence debate). Proponents of reality
programming argue that the violence in reality programming serves legitimate
purposes which contribute to their popularity. See George Vradenburg III, Under-
standing Violence on Television, 11 COMM. LAw. 9, 10 (1993) (arguing that reality
programs - like "COPS" - show viewers "adverse consequences of antisocial violent
behavior"). For more discussion regarding the violent content of reality programs,
see infra note 8.
Notwithstanding America's enduring interest in violence, experts have noted
other reasons for the success of reality programming. Some sources believe the
success of reality programming is linked to the public's growing mistrust and lack
of confidence in law enforcement officials. See Lunday, supra note 2, at 278.
Others note that networks are drawn towards reality programming because the
shows are cheaper to produce than other types of programming. See Richard Tur-
ner, News Corp. 's Fox Forms News Unit Headed by Chao, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1992, at
B8; Richard Zoglin, Goodbye to the Mass Audience: In a Fall of Failure, the Networks
Struggle to Learn a New, More Competitive Game, TIME, Nov. 19, 1990, at 122. Sources
also attribute the recent glut of reality programs to advances in visual recording
technology which capture dramatic footage and "turn undercover work into highly
rated entertainment." Kurtz, supra note 2, at Al. Still others believe that reality
programming appeals to the public's obscure desire for shows which fall "some-
where on the spectrum between hard news and pure entertainment." Thomas D.
Yannucci, Debunking "The Big Chill" - Why Defamation Suits by Corporations are Con-
sistent with the First Amendment, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1187, 1190 (1995).
4. See Elsa Y. Ransom, Home: No Place for "Law Enforcement Theatricals" - The
Outlawing of Police/Media Home Invasions in Ayeni v. Mottola, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J.
325 (1995) (discussing public's voracious appetite for reality-based police shows
that give viewer close-up look at searches and arrests).
5. See Zoglin, supra note 1, at 62. Many police officers welcome the television
exposure, believing that the programs convey their human sides and dispel their
"Dirty Harry" images. See id. According to some officers, the presence of a televi-
sion camera in plain sight keeps police on their best behavior. See id. In addition,
police officers believe that the presence of television cameras inhibits suspects
from getting violent. See id.
6. See Alan Bash, Viewers Can Get a Dose of Reality in Syndication, USA TODAY,
May 30, 1995, at 3D (discussing how Fox and CBS have opted to cut and replace
reality shows due to diminishing value of reality television).
7. See Pete Schulberg, You Want Shock-TV? Try Scariest Car Chases, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Feb. 1, 1997, at CI (noting that broadcasters have pulled some of
their reality programs in response to drops in viewer interest).
[Vol. 5: p. 481
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television.8 Statistics have shown that viewers are more unnerved by
content on reality programs and news stories than by fictional pro-
grams.9 In light of these statistics, critics are especially concerned
with the number of young children tuning into reality and reality-
based programs.10
Despite the controversy behind reality programming, most net-
works have overcome their reservations about airing the shows.11
The public's craving for police chases is too strong to be ignored by
networks. 12 Reality television has remained popular because it of-
fers viewers the unexpected. 13 Networks have preserved the appeal
8. See id. In the early 1990s, a network took its program "American Detective"
off the air despite favorable ratings when advertisers expressed concern about the
program's content. See id. Many authors attribute the upsurge of violent crimes
reported in the late 1980s and 1990s to increased violence in television programs
and movies. See, e.g., James Alan Fox & Glenn Pierce, American Killers Are Getting
Younger, USA ToDAY, Jan. 1, 1994, at 24. Opponents of violent programming claim
that violent programs "glorify criminals, transforming insignificant and obscure
nobodies into national celebrities." Id.
9. See Donna Gable, Reality-Based Violence Hits Harder, USA TODAY, May 10,
1994, at 3D. According to a USA Today survey, 64% of those who watch news pro-
grams say that something they saw on the news unnerved them. See id. In contrast,
less than 25% of those who watch fictional programs reported being bothered by
the content. See id.
10. See id. In a USA Today/Nickelodeon survey of 503 children ages 8 to 12,
more than 50% said that they enjoyed watching Fox Network's "COPS". See id. Yet
almost two-thirds admit to being scared or upset by what they saw on these shows.
See Gable, supra note 9, at 3D. William Abbot, president of the National Founda-
tion to Improve Television, says that violent images on television, whether real or
fictional, teach children that violent behavior is acceptable in society. See id.
In response to these arguments, several proponents of reality television insist
that parents are to blame for any negative effects television has on their children.
See id. In support of this contention, John Langley, the creator of "COPS," noted
that parents are responsible if their children suffer aftershock from television vio-
lence. See id. According to Langley, "'COPS' was not designed for kids ages 8-12,
so if a kid under 12 is watching, [it is understandable] why what they're seeing is
having an impact on them." Id. For a discussion of violence debate surrounding
reality television, see Guttman, supra note 3, at 46 (discussing general public's
opinion of violent programming like reality programs); Laura B. Schneider, Warn-
ing: Television Violence May Be Harmful to Children; But the First Amendment May Foil
Congressional Attempts to Legislate Against It, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 477 (1994) (discuss-
ing reality programs' impact on viewer's perceptions of world); Richard Zoglin,
The Networks Run for Cover: To Avoid a Warning Label, Violent Shows Are Getting Toned
Down - Or Dropped, TIME, Aug. 2, 1993, at 52 (discussing advertisers' willingness to
advertise alongside programs having violence warnings).
11. See Schulberg, supra note 7, at Cl. By February, 1997, reality shows were
"back with a vengeance." Id. Some authors believe that networks cast away their
concerns and brought back reality programs largely based on their desire for
higher ratings. See id.
12. See id. (noting that television viewers are not inclined to change channel
when watching actual police officers in hot pursuit of criminals).
13. See id. According to program creators like Paul Stojanovich, who created
"COPS" and "American Detective," people continue to watch reality programs be-
cause of their unpredictability. See Schulberg, supra note 7, at C1.
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of reality programs by limiting the number of episodes aired in a
season. 14 Other networks have kept reality programs alive by releas-
ing them for syndication. 15
As reality programming became more and more popular in the
1990s, legal questions emerged with respect to media representa-
tives who accompany police officers during searches. In 1994, the
federal courts began addressing legal issues that arose when police
officers permitted television crews to accompany them during the
execution of search warrants in suspects' homes.1 6 These issues in-
clude: (1) whether such conduct violates a suspect's Fourth Amend-
ment rights, (2) whether police officers who permit media to
accompany them during searches are entitled to qualified immu-
nity from civil rights actions, and (3) whether media personnel who
accompany police officers during searches are subject to civil rights
actions.1 7 Courts remain divided as to whether police officers are
entitled to qualified immunity from civil rights claims, and whether
media representatives who accompany police officers during
searches are subject to civil rights claims.' 8 In Parker v. Boyer' 9
(Parker I), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit concluded that neither police officers nor a television news sta-
tion were liable for civil rights violations when the station's camera
14. See Bash, supra note 6, at 3D. For example, in the spring of 1997, CBS cut
the reality-based program "Rescue-91 1" from its fall lineup. See id. Nevertheless,
CBS ordered 13 episodes for its midseason lineup. See id. The Fox network re-
duced the air time of its reality program, "COPS," from two episodes per week to
one. See id. Another reality show, "America's Most Wanted," was cut from 60 min-
utes to 30 minutes. See id.
Despite these cutbacks, producers of the shows have responded positively, be-
lieving that the reduced number of shows produced will keep the programs fresh
and ultimately increase their longevity. See Bash, supra note 6, at 3D. For instance,
new episodes of "COPS" were once broadcast each week paired with older reruns.
See id. By eliminating the weekly reruns, the show's producer, John Langley, was
able to spread more episodes out over longer periods, thereby reducing the fre-
quency of reruns. See id.
15. See Bash, supra note 6, at 3D. Reality-based programs that moved to syndi-
cation include "Real Stories of the Highway Patrol," "Top Cops" and "Emergency
Call." See id.
16. See, e.g., Ayeni v. Mottola (Ayeni 11), 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing
Fourth Amendment implications when secret service agents allow media to accom-
pany them during searches of homes). For a detailed discussion of Ayeni II, see
infra notes 87-94.
17. See Ayeni v. CBS (Ayeni 1), 848 F. Supp. 362, 365-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (dis-
cussing whether qualified immunity should be granted to Secret Service agent and
major television network for jointly engaging in search of person's home).
18. For a discussion of the disagreement between federal courts regarding the
qualified immunity issue, see infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of the disagreement between federal courts regarding the liability of media
representatives, see infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
19. 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996).
[Vol. 5: p. 481
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crew accompanied police officers into a private home during the
execution of a search warrant and videotaped the search.20
Section II of this Note begins with a discussion of the facts sur-
rounding Parker 11.21 Section III summarizes the development of
legal issues that arise when the media accompanies police officers
during the execution of a search warrant and records the search. 22
Section IV examines the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Parker IL.23 Sec-
tion V analyzes the Eighth Circuit's decision in light of earlier deci-
sions by the Supreme Court and other circuit courts.2 4 Section VI
discusses the impact that the Eighth Circuit's decision will have on
qualified immunity of police officers in similar situations and media
participation in police searches.25
II. FACTS
In 1994, RandyJackson, a reporter from the St. Louis television
station Multi-Media KSDK, Inc. (KSDK), began developing a news
story which profiled the St. Louis Police Department's efforts to
eradicate illegal weapons.26 Jackson contacted the police depart-
ment's mobile reserve unit and informed them that he was inter-
ested in running a news story about law enforcement efforts against
the trade of illegal weapons. 27 A short time later, the police con-
tacted Jackson and informed him that he was welcome to cover a
weapons investigation that was in progress.28 The investigation fo-
cused on Travis Martin, a man who resided with the plaintiffs, San-
dra Parker and her sixteen year old daughter, Dana.29
On February 9, 1994, Sergeant Simon Risk informed Officer
Rodney Boyer that KSDK personnel would be accompanying him
20. See id. at 447-48.
21. For a discussion of the facts in Parker I, see infra notes 26-38 and accom-
panying text.
22. For a discussion of the legal issues arising from police-media searches, see
infra notes 39-136 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Parker H1, see infra notes
137-56 and accompanying text.
24. For an analysis of the Eighth Circuit's decision, see infra notes 157-95 and
accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of Parker II's impact on police/media searches and the
legal analysis of similar cases, see infra notes 196-207 and accompanying text.
26. See Parker v. Clarke (Parker I), 905 F. Supp. 638, 640 (E.D. Mo. 1995),
modified, 910 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Mo. 1995), modified, Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445
(8th Cir. 1996).
27. See id. at 641.
28. See id.
29. See Parker 11, 93 F.3d at 446. Travis Martin was a relative of the plaintiffs.
See Parker I, 905 F. Supp. at 641.
1998]
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on his shift that evening. 30 KSDK personnel joined up with Officer
Boyer and Officer Dan Dell, and the group drove to Sandra
Parker's residence in a police car.3 1 After police detained Martin
outside the house, seven police officers, including Boyer and Dell,
executed a search warrant of the house.3 2 Jackson and Jeff McCol-
lum, a camera operator from KSDK, followed the police officers
into the house and filmed the execution of the search warrant.33
KSDK subsequently broadcast the tapes recorded at the Parker's
residence on several news programs. 34
The plaintiffs brought suit against the police officers that con-
ducted the search and KSDK, asserting violations of their civil
rights35 and state tort law.3 6 On appeal, the United States Court of
30. See Parker I, 905 F. Supp. at 641.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 446-47. The scope of the search warrant included cocaine, her-
oin, weapons, currency and records of drug transactions. See Parker 1, 905 F. Supp.
at 640. Two weapons and several substances believed to be rock cocaine and pow-
der cocaine were seized during the search. See id. at 641. Martin was subsequently
arrested for controlled substances and firearms offenses, but charges were never
filed against him. See id.
33. See Parker I, 905 F. Supp. at 641. The police did not give any instructions
or directions to KSDK personnel, nor did police impose any restrictions on their
conduct or what they could record. See id.
According to testimony given by the chief of police, department policy re-
quired that the media obtain permission from the person living at the residence to
videotape the search. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 447. If permission was not obtained,
the supervising officer on the scene was to prohibit the media from entering the
residence, as such conduct would constitute a trespass. See id. Neither the police
officers nor KSDK personnel obtained any permission to record the search of the
Parker's residence or broadcast any portion of the recording. See id. However,
neither the Parkers nor the police officers asked the KSDK personnel to leave the
premises at any time. See id.
34. See Parker , 905 F. Supp. at 641. Some or all of the footage recorded by
KSDK personnel was broadcast on local news programs on February 9, 10, 11, and
May 6, 1994. See id.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1997).
36. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 446. The United States District Court for the East-
ern Division of Missouri granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs against Of-
ficer Boyer, Officer Dell and Sgt. Risk on the § 1983 claims based on violation of
the Fourth Amendment. See Parker 1, 905 F. Supp. at 644. For a discussion of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, see infra note 62 and accompanying text. According to the district
court, "Boyer and Dell were the most directly involved in the determination to
allow the media personnel access to the plaintiffs' house during the execution of
the search warrant." Parker I, 905 F. Supp. at 644. The district court concluded
that Sgt. Risk was liable since he was the supervisory officer who directed Boyer
and Dell to allow KSDK personnel to accompany them on their shift and was pres-
ent at the residence to supervise the execution of the search warrant. See id.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of KSDK on the Fourth
Amendment claims, finding that KSDK did not act under color of state law and
therefore could not be held liable under § 1983. See id. at 643. The district court
declined jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claims. See id. at 646. Pursuant to
an appeal, Officers Boyer, Dell and Risk filed motions with the district court for
[Vol. 5: p. 481
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the police officers were
entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims, as their conduct
did not violate clearly established Constitutional principles of which
the police, at the time of the search, should have been aware.37 In
addition, the Eighth Circuit held that KSDK personnel were not
liable under § 1983 since they were not acting "under color of state
law" when they entered the plaintiffs house and recorded the
search.38
III. BACKGROUND
The conflict in Parker II is based on the application of two legal
principles: (1) the qualified immunity of police officers from civil
actions, and (2) the "color of state law" requirement that plaintiffs
must satisfy to prevail in § 1983 claims against private parties.3 9
This Section begins by tracing the legal development of qualified
immunity as courts have applied it to police conduct.40 Part B of
this Section discusses historical interpretations of the "color of state
law" requirement, how courts have applied it to private third parties
in general and how courts have applied it specifically to media
personnel. 41
A. Qualified Immunity of Police Officers
While the concept of qualified immunity of police officers is
hardly new, the application of qualified immunity to police conduct
in the context of media ride-alongs has not been explored until
recently. 42 First, this Section begins with a discussion of the test for
qualified immunity and how it developed over time.43 Second, this
Section addresses Constitutional and statutory restrictions that de-
fine the reasonableness of police conduct during searches. 44 Third,
certification of final judgment, for clarification of the district court's order and for
a stay of proceedings. See id. at 461. The district court granted these motions. See
Parker I, 905 F. Supp. at 463-64.
37. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 447. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's analy-
sis of the qualified immunity issue, see infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
38. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 448. "Color of state law" is a concept very similar to
the notion of "state action." For a discussion of the "color of state law" and "state
action" concepts, see infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the Eighth Circuit's analysis of the color of state law issue, see infra notes 145-48
and accompanying text.
39. See Parker I, 93 F.3d at 447-48.
40. See infra notes 42-103 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 104-36 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
1998]
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this Section reviews federal and state court decisions which have
applied qualified immunity principles to police who allowed private
third parties to participate in searches of homes.45 Fourth, this Sec-
tion extends its review of cases to those few that have applied quali-
fied immunity analysis to media personnel who participated in
police searches. 46
1. Qualified Immunity of Law Enforcement Officers and the
"Reasonableness" Requirement
When law enforcement officials abuse their powers in violation
of an individual's Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unrea-
sonable searches, the individual may bring a private cause of action
for relief.47 While civil suits provide individuals with a means of
vindicating their Constitutional guarantees, they also pose a risk of
inhibiting law enforcement officials from discharging their duties. 48
Therefore, the Supreme Court has provided government officials
who perform discretionary functions, like law enforcement person-
nel, with a qualified immunity that shields them from civil damages
liability. 49 This immunity is provided so long as the government
actors reasonably thought that their actions did not violate a Consti-
tutional right.50
The most commonly cited test for qualified immunity ap-
peared first in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,51 where the Supreme Court held
that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity "if their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or Constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 52 In
45. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 74-103 and accompanying text.
47. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover money damages
for injuries suffered from narcotics agents' acts that violated plaintiffs Fourth
Amendment rights.)
48. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). The lingering threat
of having to pay damages may instill a fear in government officials of personal
monetary liability and harassing litigation. See id.
49. See id. According to the Supreme Court, qualified immunity protects "all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Bills v. Asel-
tine, 52 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986)).
50. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638 (1987).
51. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
52. Id. at 818. According to the Court, reliance on the objective reasonable-
ness of an official's conduct in the context of clearly established law would avoid
the disruption of government functions and dispose of insubstantial claims against
government officials. See id. In deciding what the official should have known, the
[Vol. 5: p. 481
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Anderson v. Creighton,53 the Supreme Court clarified the definition
of a "clearly established" right.5 4 According to the Court, the plain-
tiff does not need to show applicable case law that explicitly recog-
nizes the right asserted by the plaintiff.55 Nor must the plaintiff
show case law on point which explicitly holds that conduct similar
to the conduct alleged is unconstitutional.5 6 A right that is violated
court should determine: (1) the currently applicable law, and (2) whether the ap-
plicable law was established at the time the actions in question occurred. See id.
In Harlow, A. Ernest Fitzgerald brought suit against senior White House aides
who allegedly conspired to wrongfully discharge Fitzgerald from his position with
the Department of the Air Force. See id. at 804. According to Fitzgerald, White
House aides planned to terminate his position after word spread that he planned
to publicize "shoddy purchasing practices" by the Nixon Administration. See
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 804 (1982).
After establishing that the aides were entitled only to qualified immunity, as
opposed to absolute immunity, the Supreme Court established the criteria for
granting qualified immunity to government officials. See id. at 818. The Supreme
Court stated,
[w]e ... hold that government officials performing discretionary func-
tions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or Constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
... On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine,
not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly
established at the time an action occurred.
Id. The Supreme Court remanded the case to address whether Fitzgerald's pretrial
showings were sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. See id. at
819-20.
53. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
54. See id. at 640. In Anderson, FBI agents conducted a warrantless search of
the Creighton family's home based on the belief that an individual suspected of
robbing a bank earlier that day may have been hiding there. See id. at 637. Robert
Creighton asked FBI Agent Anderson to show him a warrant for the search. See
Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1270 (8th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). Agent Anderson replied, "[w]e don't
have a search warrant [and] we don't need [one]; you watch too much T.V." See
id. The search turned out to be fruitless. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 637.
The Creightons subsequently filed a claim for damages against Anderson,
claiming Anderson violated their Fourth Amendment rights. See id. Anderson
filed a motion for summaryjudgment, arguing the claim was barred by Anderson's
qualified immunity. See id. The district court granted Anderson's motion for sum-
mary judgment, finding that Anderson had probable cause to search the Creigh-
ton's home and that exigent circumstances justified his failure to obtain a warrant.
See id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment, finding that there were unresolved factual issues as to whether
the agents had probable cause and whether exigent circumstances existed. See id.
at 637-38. The court of appeals also reversed summary judgment on qualified im-
munity grounds, since the Creightons' right to be protected from unreasonable
searches was clearly established. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638. The Supreme Court
vacated the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings
to allow Agent Anderson to present facts establishing that he could have reason-
ably believed that the search was lawful. See id. at 646.
55. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
56. See id.
9
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by an official's act will be deemed "clearly established" if the unlaw-
fulness of the official's act is apparent to a reasonable person in
light of pre-existing law.57 In Anderson, the Supreme Court empha-
sized that the right which the plaintiff alleges is violated must be a
specific right rather than a general principle expressed in the Con-
stitution. 58 Therefore, the plaintiff must assert a violation of a spe-
cific right that is concrete enough to enable a reasonable official to
understand that his actions are violating that right.5 9
2. Constitutional Background and Statutory Development
Americans have placed great value on the inviolability of the
home, providing for its protection in the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution. 60 From this core principle, our laws have grown to
treat warrantless entry into a home as unreasonable per se and
therefore unconstitutional (assuming no exigent circumstances). 61
Congress has provided a private cause of action for violations of
Constitutional rights in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.62 Congress designed
57. See id.
58. See id. at 640-41. Justice Scalia stated that although a general Fourth
Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches is clearly established, it
does not follow that Agent Anderson's search without a warrant was unreasonable.
See id. at 641. Justice Scalia noted that it is easy for officers to mistakenly determine
that there is probable cause in a given situation. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.
Therefore, the reasonableness of an agent's conduct will not stem from a general
Fourth Amendment principle, but rather from specific facts pertaining to what
information was available to the agent. See id. Absent a clearly established specific
right asserted by the Creightons, the Court refused to create an exception to the
general rule of qualified immunity for situations where agents conduct warranfless
searches believing that there is sufficient probable cause and exigent circum-
stances. See id.
59. See David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court:
Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 23, 48
(1989) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Applying this
interpretation to Parker II, the Parkers would have the burden of showing that the
St. Louis Police Department violated their Constitutional right to be free from
police searches in which parties other than legitimate law enforcement officials are
invited to watch and record.
60. See Antonio Yanez, Jr., Ayeni v. Mottola and the Implications of Characterizing
Videotaping as a Fourth Amendment Seizure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 507, 531 (1995). The
Fourth Amendment provides, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their...
houses ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "'[T]he right of a man to retreat into his own home' has,
in fact, been deemed to stand 'at the very core of the Fourth Amendment."'
Yanez, supra, at 532 (quoting Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992)); see
also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (noting that right to
privacy in dwellings is "ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment
protection").
61. See Yanez, supra note 60, at 532.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1997). Under § 1983, "[e]very person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or
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§ 1983 to deter government officials from violating individuals'
Constitutional rights. 63 Section 1983 is also a compensatory remedy
which attempts to make whole victims of wrongful government
conduct.64
With regard to search warrants, Congress enacted legislation to
limit who may serve a search warrant.65 Although not expressly
stated in the statute, many courts have construed 18 U.S.C. § 3105
as determining who may "execute" a warrant.66 While § 1983 is not
controlling authority which limits the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment, courts have used it when assessing the "reasonableness" of
police officers' conduct under the Fourth Amendment in permit-
ting private third parties to be present during the execution of
search warrants. 67
3. Lawfulness of Private Third Party Involvement in Police Searches
Several circuit courts have addressed the lawfulness of police
officers inviting private parties to participate in, or witness the exe-
cution of, a search warrant in a private home. In Buonocore v. Har-
ris,68 the Fourth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any
rights.., secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
.... " Id.
63. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's
Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 755, 820 (1992) (discussing deterrent value of
§ 1983).
64. See id. at 757. Section 1983 provides a make-whole remedy "without chil-
ling the discretion necessary to the conduct of well-intentioned, vigorous govern-
ment actors." Id.
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1997). According to the statute, "[a] search warrant
may in all cases be served by any of the officers mentioned in its direction or by an
officer authorized by law to serve such warrant, but by no other person, except in
aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being present and acting in its execution."
Id.
66. See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 687 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that § 3105
identifies who may serve and who may execute search warrants); United States v.
Wright, 667 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that § 3105 authorizes officers to
utilize assistance of other law enforcement officers in execution of search war-
rants); United States v. Clouston, 623 F.2d 485, 486 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that
§ 3105 allowed telephone company employees to assist in execution of search war-
rant); United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1973) (noting that § 3105
restricts the execution of search warrants to certain law enforcement officers).
67. See Ransom, supra note 4, at 335. In United States v. Clouston, the Sixth
Circuit held that it was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for law
enforcement officers to have telephone company employees present during the
search to aid the officers. 623 F.2d 485, 486-87 (6th Cir. 1980). Similarly, in United
States v. Gambino, the district court held that the presence and assistance of a confi-
dential informant during a search executed by police officers was not unreasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment. 734 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
68. 65 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 1995).
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government agents from using search warrants to allow private indi-
viduals to conduct their own independent search of a suspect's
home for items unrelated to those specified in the warrant. 69 Con-
versely, in Bills v. Aseltine,70 the Sixth Circuit affirmed a holding in
favor of a police officer who invited a private party into a suspect's
home to conduct an independent search during the execution of a
search warrant. 71
In United States v. Wright,72 the Ninth Circuit held that a search
warrant may not be executed by individuals, except those who spe-
cifically aid the officer and are authorized to conduct the search. 73
69. See id. at 356. In Buonocore, a police officer received information about
illegal and unregistered firearms at an individual's address. See id. at 350. The
officer was also told that the suspect possessed equipment stolen from a telephone
company who employed the suspect. See id. In addition to obtaining a search war-
rant for the firearms, the police officer invited a corporate security officer from the
suspect's employer to accompany him during the execution of the search warrant
and to conduct his own independent search for stolen company property. See id.
The search warrant did not authorize any security officer to be present during the
search, and the search warrant did not authorize any search for company property.
See Buonocore, 65 F.3d at 350.
70. 52 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 1995).
71. Id. at 599. In a case very similar to Buonocore, a police officer allowed a
security officer from General Motors Corporation (GM) to conduct his own search
for stolen GM property in the plaintiff's house during the execution of a search
warrant for unrelated items. See id. The police officer obtained a search warrant
for the items unrelated to the GM property, but did not seek a search warrant for
the GM property because he felt he lacked sufficient probable cause. See id.
Therefore, the police officer invited the GM security officer to identify and photo-
graph GM property in order to obtain the requisite probable cause for a second
warrant to seize the GM property. See id. Unlike the court in Buonocore, the district
court in Bills submitted the issue to a jury as to whether the officer's conduct vio-
lated clearly established law. See Bills, 52 F.3d at 600. The jury concluded that the
officer's action in allowing the GM security officer to tour the plaintiff's home with
a camera for purposes unconnected with search warrant did not unreasonably ex-
ceed the scope of the search warrant. See id.
72. 667 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1982).
73. See id. at 797. In Wright, an agent from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) requested that an agent from the California Bureau
of Narcotics Enforcement accompany him during the execution of a search war-
rant which authorized the seizure of a driver's license to be used as evidence of
alleged firearm violations. See id. at 795. The ATF agent invited the narcotics of-
ficer because the suspect had a reputation of being a major narcotics dealer, and
the narcotics agent could provide expertise in narcotics-related matters. See id.
The Ninth Circuit held that the ATF's conduct in bringing the state narcotics of-
ficer into the search was authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3105, since the narcotics officer
acted "in aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being present and acting in [the
search's] execution." Id. at 797 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3105).
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4. Lawfulness of Media Involvement in Police Searches
The First Amendment74 protects the media from restrictions
that interfere with their freedom to gather and report news. 75 As a
result, Congress and state legislatures have traditionally favored the
media's interests in free speech over the interests of private individ-
uals.7 6 The Supreme Court has placed limits on freedom of speech,
however, so that media representatives who exercise this right must
do so without interfering with other competing interests.
77
Until recently, courts never addressed the legal issues that arise
when representatives of the media and television industries accom-
pany police officers during searches of homes. As a growing
number of media representatives have used invasive techniques in
gathering their news, lawsuits against the media have steadily
grown. 78 Recent proliferation of news and information programs
has bred intense competition among television producers, and re-
porters have become more aggressive in their news gathering.
7 9
Driven by economic pressures to produce programs and stories that
sell, many media representatives have increased their output of sen-
sationalized programming.80 Recent technological advances have
74. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press...." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
75. See Yannucci, supra note 3, at 1187. Amidst all the civil liberties which
Americans enjoy, freedom of speech and the press lies at the core of American
freedoms. See id.
76. See id. Americans are willing to put aside private interests to preserve pub-
lic debate. See id. For a discussion of the current vitality of the media fostered by
the First Amendment, see infra note 79.
77. SeeYannucci, supra note 3, at 1187. Issues of public safety, national secur-
ity and the right to protect one's reputation are all interests that compete with and
limit the exercise of free speech. See id.
78. See Maura Dolan, When the Camera is Too Candid - Legal Battles are Focusing
on Tabloid TV, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1997, at Al (discussing evolving body of law
pitting rights of individuals against techniques employed in areas like tabloid tele-
vision and investigative journalism).
79. See Yannucci, supra note 3, at 1192. The current vitality of the media is
reflected by the ever increasing number of media outlets, which have grown to the
point of oversaturation. See id. at 1189. Television viewers have access to several
"news magazine" programs like "60 Minutes," "Dateline NBC" and "20/20." See id.
In addition, there are an endless number of television talk shows, including "Larry
King Live" and "Geraldo." See id. A number of networks focus exclusively on news,
information and "infotainment." See id. at 1190.
80. SeeYanucci, supra note 3, at 1190-91. The growth of sensationalized pro-
gramming is most notable in today's talk shows. See id. at 1191. The Phil Donahue
Show, for example, once covered issues in politics with reputable guests. See id. By
1995, however, the show found itself immersed in the battle for ratings with tabloid
television, and topics quickly became more sensationalized. See id. Phil Donahue
announced his retirement later that year, citing concern for the increased compe-
tition from tabloid television. See id.
19981
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fostered competition even more, providing programmers with
faster and more creative ways to broadcast the news."' For the first
time, television producers have both the means and the market for
taping the private lives of ordinary people.82 Many members of the
media have responded to the competitive market by resorting to
questionable tactics in gathering their news. 83 As a result, victims of
media exposure have filed various lawsuits against the media, in-
cluding claims based on defamation, 84 privacy 85 and violations of
the Fourth Amendment. 86
In Ayeni v. Mottola8 7 (Ayeni I), federal courts explored the Con-
stitutional issues surrounding police officers who permit the pres-
ence of media participants during searches.88 On appeal, the
81. SeeYanucci, supra note 3, at 1190. A video camera can now be made small
enough to fit into a button. See Maura Dolan, The Right to Know vs. The Right to
Privacy - with Cameras Following Cops and Accident Scenes Being Broadcast on TV, the
Law Is Struggling to Keep up As Tabloid Shows Get More Aggressive, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1,
1997, at Al. Modem sound equipment can capture whispers, amplify them and
broadcast them to millions of television viewers. See id.
82. See Gail Diane Cox, Privacy's Frontiers at Issue - Unwilling Subjects of Tabloid
TV Are Suing, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1993, at 1 (noting that technological advance-
ments in videotaping have arrived as expanding cable industry demands cheaper
footage).
83. See Yannucci, supra note 3, at 1188. While the First Amendment entitles
the media to broadcast matters of public concern, members of the media have
engaged in increasingly intrusive tactics in gathering their news. See Dolan, supra
note 81, at Al. Camera crews have followed paramedics into the bedrooms of
heart attack victims and followed police officers into homes in response to domes-
tic violence calls. See id. In addition to overt camera work, the media has em-
ployed concealed techniques, like creative editing and hidden cameras to gather
news material. See Yannucci, supra note 3, at 1191. For example, Mike Wallace of
the program "60 Minutes" confessed to videotaping an interview with an individual
who asked not to be taped. See id.
84. See Symposium, Current Issues in Media and Telecommunications Law, Panel I.
Accountability of the Media in Investigations, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 401 (1997) (discussing defamation suit by security guard RichardJewell against
NBC regarding FBI's investigation of Centennial Olympic Park bombing during
1996 Olympics).
85. See Ransom, supra note 4, at 346-47 (discussing intrusion claims against
media representatives who physically trespass on private property without plain-
tiff's consent).
86. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
87. 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
88. See id. In Ayeni II, a Secret Service agent brought three members of a CBS
television crew into a suspect's home while the agent executed the search warrant.
See id. at 683. The CBS crew, who were engaged in a weekly news magazine pro-
gram called "Street Stories," followed the agents during the search and recorded
events using a video camera and sound recording devices. See id. Mrs. Ayeni, the
suspect's wife, and her young son were home alone when agents forced their way
into the apartment. See id. Dressed only in a night gown, Mrs. Ayeni objected to
the crew's videotaping of her and her son. See Ayeni II, 35 F.3d at 683. According
to the record, Mrs. Ayeni tried to avoid the camera by covering her and her son's
face with a magazine. See id. The agent grabbed the magazine out of her hand,
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Second Circuit held that clearly established Constitutional princi-
ples prohibit law enforcement officials from permitting media per-
sonnel to enter a home during the execution of a search warrant.8 9
To support its conclusion, the court relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3105,
which identifies who may serve a search warrant.90 According to
the Second Circuit, § 3105 forbids private third parties from partici-
pating in the execution of search warrants, unless they are specifi-
cally present to aid the police officers.91 Since the CBS camera
crew was not assisting the Secret Service agents in any way, the Sec-
threw it on the floor, and told the plaintiffs to "shut up." See id. The defendant
then directed the camera crew to videotape Mrs. Ayeni's face. See id. The camera
crew also filmed the agents searching the home, capturing many of the Ayeni's
personal effects such as books, photographs, financial statements and personal let-
ters on videotape. See id. at 683. CBS videotaped the search for approximately 20
minutes but never broadcast any of the footage. See Ayeni II, 35 F.3d at 684.
The Ayenis brought § 1983 actions against Agent Mottola, other agents and
CBS, claiming violations of their Fourth Amendment rights. See id. The district
court concluded that CBS had violated the Ayenis' Fourth Amendment rights and
denied CBS qualified immunity. See Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 367-68. CBS
negotiated a confidential settlement with the Ayenis, and Agent Mottola was the
sole defendant on appeal. See Ayeni II, 35 F.3d at 684 n.2. For further discussion of
the Ayenis' suit against CBS, see infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
89. See Ayeni II, 35 F.3d at 686. According to the Second Circuit, the plain
language of the Fourth Amendment clearly prohibits unreasonable searches, in-
cluding when a court or magistrate has issued a warrant. See id. The conduct of
law enforcement officers who execute search warrants is limited to either: (1)
those actions expressly authorized in the warrant; or (2) additional actions that are
so closely related to accomplishing the search that their authorization is implicit in
the warrant. See id. at 685. The Second Circuit found that the CBS news crew was
not expressly authorized to assist in carrying out the search warrant. See id. In
addition, the Second Circuit found that the CBS news crew did not serve any legiti-
mate law enforcement purpose which the search warrant implicitly authorized. See
id.
After establishing that Agent Mottola violated the Fourth Amendment, the
Second Circuit went on to hold that the Fourth Amendment rights that Agent
Mottola violated were clearly established principles that he should have known. See
Ayeni II, 35 F.3d at 685. In arriving at its conclusion, the majority noted that
Fourth Amendment's objective of preserving the right to privacy to the maximum
extent was "long established." Id.
90. See id. at 687.
91. See id. The express language of § 3105 limits who may serve a search war-
rant. 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1997). For a discussion of the language of § 3105, see
supra note 65 and accompanying text. According to the Second Circuit, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3105 also may be construed to limit those who may participate in the execution
of a search warrant. See Ayeni II, 35 F.3d at 687. Following the Second Circuit,
many courts have construed the reach of the Fourth Amendment "reasonableness
requirement" in light of § 3105 and held that the presence of a third party during
a search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment "reasonableness require-
ment," unless the third party is assisting the police officers in their search. See id.
(citing United States v. Clouston, 623 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1980) and United States v.
Gambino, 734 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
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ond Circuit concluded that the officers clearly violated § 3105.92
According to the court, § 3105 provides guidance on the Constitu-
tional issue of unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.93
Since the Secret Service agents violated § 3105, the Court viewed
the agents' conduct during the search as unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.94
In Stack v. Killian,95 the Sixth Circuit held that police officers'
conduct in permitting the presence of a news reporter and televi-
sion cameras during a search was not unconstitutional.9 6 Unlike
the facts in Ayeni II, the search warrant in Stack explicitly authorized
videotaping and photographing.97 The Sixth Circuit did not indi-
cate whether such action would be unconstitutional or whether
qualified immunity would apply to the officers' conduct if the war-
rant had not authorized videotaping and photographing.98
92. See Ayeni II, 35 F.3d at 687. According to Chief Judge Newman, the CBS
news crew did not assist the secret service agents for any legitimate law enforce-
ment purpose. See id. Judge Newman believed the opposite to be true; that is, he




95. 96 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 1996).
96. See id. at 163. In Stack, a veterinarian with the Michigan Department of
Agriculture obtained a search warrant for the plaintiff's premises. See id. at 161.
The plaintiff, Stack, operated a non-profit animal shelter on the property where
she resided, housing approximately 300 dogs and cats. See id. The search warrant
was executed under the supervision of three county sheriffs deputies who were
named as defendants. See id. A news reporter and a television camera crew were
also present during the search. See Stack, 96 F.3d at 161. After being arrested and
charged with animal cruelty, Stack pleaded nolo contendre to one count of animal
cruelty and was found guilty on counts of improper burial of animals. See id. The
plaintiff and animal shelter subsequently filed a § 1983 action against the deputies,
the veterinarian and an employee of the Michigan Anti-Cruelty Society who were
all present during the search. See id. The district court granted the police officers'
motions for summary judgment based on the qualified immunity defense. See id.
The appellate court found that summary judgment was improper since there was a
genuine issue of fact as to whether the police officers' conduct unreasonably ex-
ceeded the scope of the warrant. See id. at 162.
97. See Stack, 96 F.3d at 163. Since the search warrant expressly authorized
videotaping and photographing during the execution of the search warrant, the
court of appeals found that the police officers' conduct in allowing the television
crew to accompany the search was justified and therefore Constitutional. See id.
Interestingly, the warrant did not say anything about a television crew; rather, it
only authorized videotaping and photographing during the search. See id. There-
fore, the court did not give reasons for concluding that the news reporter and
television crew were authorized to execute the search warrant. See id.
98. See id.
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District courts have yielded contrasting holdings in light of the
aforementioned circuit court decisions. 99 In Hagler v. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc.,100 the district court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania adopted the Second Circuit's analysis in Ayeni II and
denied qualified immunity to two police officers who invited news-
paper reporters and a photographer into a home during the execu-
tion of a search warrant. 10 1 In contrast, a district court in Berger v.
Hanlon0 2 (Hanlon 1) rejected the Second Circuit's analysis, dis-
missing § 1983 claims against federal agents who permitted a cam-
era crew from the Cable News Network (CNN) to accompany a
search of the plaintiff's land.10 3
99. See David W. Zimmerman & Randy L. Dryer, Recent Developments in Media
Law, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 481 (1997).
100. No. CIV.A.96-2154, 1996 WL 408605 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 1996).
101. See id. at *3. In Hagler, two officers from the Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment executed a search warrant for narcotics. See id. at *1. Sandi Hagler and her
two young children were in the house at the time the police executed the warrant.
See id. Two newspaper reporters and a photographer from the Philadelphia Daily
News (Daily News) accompanied the officers during the search. See id. Several
photographs of the children appeared in the Daily News, including some showing
the children clothed only in underwear. See Hagler, 1996 WL 408605, at *1.
Among other claims, the plaintiffs filed a claim against the police officers for viola-
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id.
The court concluded that the officers should have known that a warrant is-
sued only in the name of the officers for the limited search of narcotics did not
authorize them to allow members of the media to enter the home. See id. at *2.
According to the court, "[a] reasonable person would know that the purpose of a
warrant is to facilitate proper law enforcement, not to provide a 'photo opportu-
nity.' A search warrant is simply not a press pass." Id. In denying the officers'
motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim, the court noted that "[the officer] exceeded
well established principles when he brought into the [plaintiff's] home persons
who were neither authorized by the warrant to be there nor serving any legitimate
law enforcement purpose by being there." Id. at *3 (quoting Ayeni II, 35 F.3d 680,
686 (2d Cir. 1994)).
102. No. CV 94-46-BLG-JDS, 1996 WL 376364 (D. Mont. Feb. 26,1996), modi-
fied, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997) (Hanlon 1).
103. See id. at *6. In Hanlon I, the United States Department of Interior's Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) investigated Berger, after receiving reports that he was
using poisons to kill predators on his ranch, including a protected species of ea-
gles. See id. at *1. The FWS obtained a search warrant for Berger's ranch, and FWS
agents executed the warrant. See id. Prior to execution of the warrant, the govern-
ment gave permission to the Cable News Network (CNN) to accompany federal
and state agents during the execution of the search warrant. See id. On March 24,
1993, the CNN crew accompanied the officers during the search and filmed the
execution of the search warrant. See Hanlon 1, 1996 WL 376364, at *1. CNN subse-
quently broadcast the tapes from the investigation on a news story about ranchers
killing predators. See id.
Among other claims, Berger filed a § 1983 action against federal agents Rod-
ney Hanlon, Joel Scrafford, Richard C. Branzell, Robert Prieksat and Assistant
United States Attorney Kris A. McLean. See id. The district court rejected the Sec-
ond Circuit's analysis in Ayeni II, finding that the Second Circuit erred in their
analysis of qualified immunity. See id. at *4. According to the court, the Second
Circuit failed to follow the Supreme Court's instructions in Anderson by basing
17
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B. "Color of State Law"
This Section discusses the "color of state law" requirement
which must be satisfied in order to impose § 1983 liability on pri-
vate individuals.1 0 4 Over the years, federal courts have interpreted
the "color of state law" requirement inconsistently. 0 5 Such incon-
sistency has spread to recent cases involving § 1983 claims against
media personnel. 10 6 Consequently, the few courts that have ad-
dressed § 1983 claims against the media are split on whether televi-
sion crews are acting "under color of state law" when they follow
police officers inside homes during the execution of search
warrants.10 7
their decision on abstract Fourth Amendment principles rather than a violation of
a specific right. See id. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's test for determin-
ing whether a right is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes, see supra
notes 57-59 and accompanying text. The district court also rejected the Ayeni II
decision because it was rendered after the search in Hanlon I. See Hanlon 1, 1996
WL 376364 at *4.
The district court also distinguished United States v. Wright, on the basis that
Wright involved third parties who aided police officers during the search, while
CNN merely observed the search activities in Hanlon I. See id. In addition, the
district court distinguished Buonocore v. Harris, mainly because Buonocore involved
third parties who conducted their own private search of a home, while CNN was a
passive observer on land. See id. at *5. Finally, the district court in Hanlon Ifound
that 18 U.S.C. § 3105 does not clearly establish a Fourth Amendment violation
when police allow a television news crew to accompany them on a search, since the
statute only applies to third parties who help serve and execute a search warrant,
not television crews which observe and record the search. See id. at *6. Based on
these distinctions, the district court concluded that the law as of 1993, prohibiting
police officers from allowing a news crew to film the execution of a search warrant,
was not clearly established. See id.
In a noteworthy decision rendered after Parker II, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision in Hanlon L
Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997) (Hanlon II). According to the
Ninth Circuit, the CNN representatives actively participated in a "planned activity
that transformed the execution of a search warrant into television entertainment."
Id. at 512. Relying on the Second Circuit's decision in Ayeni II and the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Buonocore, the Ninth Circuit held that a residential search
taped with video cameras is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and law
enforcement officers who permit such taping are not protected by qualified immu-
nity. See id. Many interpret the Hanlon II decision as holding, in no uncertain
terms, that officers who allow media to videotape the execution of a search warrant
for entertainment purposes violate the Fourth Amendment and are not entitled to
qualified immunity. See Max Frankel, The Private Home As a Sound Stage for Cop
Theatrics, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 28, 1997, at F6 (noting that Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Hanlon II reiterated Ayeni II's condemnation of media participation in po-
lice searches).
104. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 115-28 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
107. See id.
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1. Private Parties Subject to § 1983 Claims
The Constitution protects people's rights from government in-
fringement, but it does not protect against infringement by private
parties.10 8 As applied to state conduct, the Fourteenth Amendment
protects against infringement by state action but fails to do the
same when private parties take equivalent actions.' 0 9 This limita-
tion upon the cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment is
known as the "state action" requirement.110 Since the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to actions by individuals, a private party
ordinarily cannot be held liable in an action brought under
§ 1983.111
An exception to this exists when the private party acts under
color of state law, as specified in § 1983.112 Although interpreted
differently by courts, the "color of state law" requirement is gener-
ally characterized as any conduct in which private parties conspire
with state officials acting under state authority." 3 In such cases, a
private conspirator may be held liable under § 1983 even if the state
official is found to be immune."14
108. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (explaining
that most rights provided by Constitution are only protected from government
infringement); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) (noting that Fourteenth
Amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discrimina-
tory or wrongful").
109. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states,
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
110. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. In its most generic terms, the "state action"
requirement refers to conduct which can be "fairly attributable to the State." Id.
The Supreme Court has recognized important purposes for the "state action" re-
quirement in § 1983 actions. See id. According to the Court, the requirement pro-
vides an area of individual freedom by restricting the reach of federal law and
federal judicial power exerted on private parties. See id. The "state action" require-
ment also protects states and state agencies from being held responsible for con-
duct for which the state or state agency, out of fairness, should not be blamed. See
id.
111. See Kenneth B. Bley, Use of the Civil Rights Act to Recover Damages in Land
Use Cases, SB14 ALI-ABA 261, 305 (1996).
112. See id.
113. See id. The "state action" requirement and "color of state law" require-
ment involve separate inquiries but do interrelate. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935 n.18.
Conduct which satisfies the "state action" requirement satisfies the "color of state
law" requirement, although the converse is not necessarily true. See id.
114. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980) (affirming decision that pri-
vate parties who conspired with judge through bribery to obtain injunction acted
under color of state law and were liable under § 1983, despite fact that judge was
found absolutely immune).
19
Rothe: The Legal Future of Reality Cop Shows: Parker v. Boyer Dismisses
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
500 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOuRNAL
2. Judicial Interpretations of the "Color of State Law" Requirement in
§ 1983
Judicial interpretations of the "color of state law" requirement
of § 1983 are inconsistent, resulting in confusion and lack of gui-
dance for analyzing § 1983 claims against private third parties. 115
The Supreme Court has articulated at least two interpretations of
the "color of state law" requirement.1 16 In a 1941 case, United States
v. Classic,117 the Supreme Court introduced a narrow interpreta-
tion, stating that action under color of state law requires "[m] isuse
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law."118
115. Geoff Lundeen Carter, Agreements Within Government Entities and Conspira-
cies Under Section 1985(3) - A New Exception to the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine?,
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1139, 1170 (1996).
116. See Douglas A. Wickham, Procedural Means of Enforcement Under 42 US.C.
§ 1983, 74 GEO. L.J. 990, 997 (1986).
117. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
118. Id. at 326. In Classic, commissioners in charge of a Louisiana election
were indicted for altering ballots and falsely certifying votes cast for the nomina-
tion of a Democratic representative for Congress. See id. at 308. According to alle-
gations, the commissioners altered 83 ballots cast for one candidate and 14 cast for
another in order to count them for a third candidate. See id. The commissioners
falsely certified the number of votes cast for each candidate to the Committee
Chairman. See id. The commissioners were charged with conspiring with each
other to deprive citizens of their Constitutional rights, namely: (1) the voters'
rights to have their ballots counted for the candidate they selected, and (2) the
candidates' rights to run for office of Congressman and to have the votes in their
favor counted as they were cast by the voters. See Classic, 313 U.S. at 308.
The indictment also charged the commissioners with violating Section 20 of
the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 52, which stated,
Whoever, under color of any law, statute ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects.., any inhabitant of any State ... to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States . . . shall be fined not more than
$1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 52 (1909) (emphasis added).
In concluding that the commissioners had acted under color of state law as
required by the criminal code, the Court noted that the commissioners had acted
in the course of their duties under the Louisiana statute requiring them to count
the ballots, record the result of the count and certify the result of the election. See
Classic, 313 U.S at 325-26. In this sense, "under color of state law" was used to refer
to acts expressly authorized by state law. See id. at 326.
In West v. Atkins, the Supreme Court applied this view, often called the tradi-
tional view, and held that a private physician under contract with the state of North
Carolina to provide medical services to inmates at a state-prison hospital acted
under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-55 (1988). In West, the
state of North Carolina was required under its own laws to provide medical care to
inmates in its prison system. See id. To comply with this law, the state prison au-
thorized and employed a private physician, Dr. Atkins, to treat prison inmates. See
id. at 55. Quincy West, an inmate at the prison, tore his left Achilles tendon while
playing volleyball at the prison. See id. at 43. West was taken to the prison-hospital
where Dr. Atkins allegedly treated him over a period of several months and con-
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In a broader interpretation, the Supreme Court in Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co.119 held that acting under color of state law requires only
that the private party is a "willful participant in joint activity with the
State or its agents."' 20 Since the Adickes decision, the Supreme
Court has applied this broad view in other contexts to find that
cluded that surgery would be necessary. See id. at 44. Despite his observations of
West's leg, Dr. Atkins allegedly refused to schedule the surgery and discharged
West while his ankle was still swollen and his movement was still impeded. See West,
487 U.S. at 44. West was not permitted to employ or elect a different physician of
his own choosing since he was a prisoner under close custody. See id. Pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, West commenced an action against Dr. Atkins for violation of his
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, claiming
that Dr. Atkins was "deliberately indifferent" to his serious medical needs. See id. at
45. Since Dr. Atkins' authorization and employment to treat prison inmates was
derived from state law, the Court concluded that Atkins was "clothed with the au-
thority of state law." See id. at 55 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,
326 (1941)). In concluding that Dr. Atkins acted under color of state law, the
Court emphasized that Atkins' function within the state system and his relation-
ship with the state established him as a state actor. See id. at 55-56. Similar to its
analysis in Classic, the Court focused narrowly on the existence of state law which
gave rise to the conduct in question. See West, 487 U.S. at 55-56.
119. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
120. Id. at 152. In Adickes, the plaintiff was a white volunteer teacher who
taught at a school for black children in Mississippi in 1964. Id. at 149. On August
14, 1964, the plaintiff took six of her students to the public library where the libra-
rian and a local policeman ordered them to leave. See id. The plaintiff and her
students then proceeded to a store owned by S. H. Kress Company (Kress) to eat
lunch. See id. After the group sat down to eat, a policeman came into the Kress
store and observed the plaintiff with the black students. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at
149. A waitress approached and took the order of the black students but refused
to serve the plaintiff because she was a white person "in the company of Negroes."
See id. After this refusal of service, the plaintiff and her students left the Kress
store. See id. Upon reaching the sidewalk outside of the store, the policeman who
had entered the store earlier arrested the plaintiff on a groundless charge of va-
grancy and took her into custody. See id.
The plaintiff commenced a § 1983 action against the Kress store, claiming
that Kress and the local police had conspired to (1) deprive her of her right to
enjoy equal treatment and service in a place of public accommodation, and (2) to
cause her arrest "on the false charge of vagrancy." See id. at 149-50. By depriving
her of her right to enjoy equal treatment and service in the store, the plaintiff
alleged that she was discriminated against because of race in violation of the Con-
stitution and of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 150 n.5. In describing the
test to determine whether Kress was acting under color of state law in its conspir-
acy with the police officer, the court noted that a private party involved in such a
conspiracy could be liable under § 1983 even though not an official of the State.
See id. at 152. According to the Court, "to act 'under color of state law' does not
require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful
participant in joint activity with the State or its agents." Id. (quoting United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)). Applying this test, the Court concluded that a
private party who discriminates on the basis of race pursuant to a state-enforced
custom requiring such discrimination is a participant in joint activity with the state
and can therefore be held liable under § 1983. See id. at 174 n.44. The Court
concluded that the lower court's dismissal of the case was in error, and the peti-
tioner was entitled to a new trial to establish a § 1983 claim. See id.
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private parties who conspire with public officials act under color of
state law. 121
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,1 2 2 the Supreme Court expressed
concern over inconsistent interpretations of the "color of state law"
requirement and granted certiorari in order to formulate a clear
test.123 The Supreme Court concluded that its previous decisions
reflected a two-part test for determining whether a private individ-
ual acted under color of state law.' 24 The first prong requires that
the claimed deprivation result from the exercise of a right or privi-
lege having its source in state authority. 125 The second prong re-
quires that the party charged be a "state actor."' 26 Many courts
121. See, e.g, Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984) (appointed counsel is
not state actor during normal course of work but becomes state actor any time he
conspires with state officials to convict his own client in violation of client's Consti-
tutional rights); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980) (private parties in
conspiracy with judge in violation of individual's civil rights are actors under color
of state law).
122. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
123. See id. at 926.
124. See id. at 937. In Lugar, the petitioner operated a truck stop in Virginia
and was indebted to the respondent, Edmondson Oil Co.(Edmondson), who was
his supplier. See id. at 924. After commencing suit on the debt in Virginia state
court, Edmondson sought a prejudgment attachment on the petitioner's property.
See id. To obtain a prejudgment attachment, Virginia procedure only required
that Edmondson allege, in an ex parte petition, a belief that the petitioner was
disposing of or might dispose of his property in order to avoid satisfying the debt
to Edmondson. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 924. A clerk of the state court approved the
petition and issued a writ of attachment which effectively sequestered the peti-
tioner's property, although the petitioner was allowed to maintain possession. See
id. at 924-25. After a hearing on the attachment and levy, a state trial judge dis-
missed the attachment because Edmondson failed to show grounds required by
statute for attachment. See id. at 925. As a result of the attachment, the petitioner
brought a § 1983 action against Edmondson, alleging that Edmondson had acted
jointly with the state to deprive him of his property without due process of law. See
id. Finding no state action on the part of Edmondson, the district court dismissed
the claim. See id. The court of appeals rejected the district court's approach, but
still found that Edmondson had not acted under color of state law since there was
no "usurpation [of power] or corruption of official power by [Edmondson] or a
surrender ofjudicial power to [Edmondson]" in such a way as to significandy com-
promise the clerk's impartiality. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 926. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, finding that the circuit court's construction of "color of state
law" was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's prior decisions. See id. After re-
viewing its prior decisions involving the "color of state law" requirement, the
Supreme Court concluded that a deprivation of a federal right must be "fairly at-
tributable to the state" to be actionable. See id. at 937. This requirement is mani-
fested in a two-part test. See id.
125. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. Specifically, the first prong requires that the
deprivation be caused by "the exercise of some right or privilege created by the
State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the
State is responsible." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
126. See id. According to the Court, a state actor could be any of the follow-
ing: (1) a state official; (2) a party "acting together with or who has obtained signif-
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have applied the "state actor" requirement by using the test set
forth in Adickes. 127 In Lugar, the Supreme Court applied this two-
prong test and confirmed that a plaintiff could establish a claim
under § 1983 against a private party defendant. 128
3. Legal Characterization of Television Crews Engaged in Police
Searches
Very few courts have analyzed whether television crews who ac-
company police officers on searches are acting under color of state
law. In Ayeni v. CBS Inc.129 (Ayeni 1), the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York considered whether the
Central Broadcasting Service (CBS) was entitled to qualified immu-
nity from a § 1983 claim that was filed after a CBS camera crew
accompanied federal agents and filmed the execution of a federal
search warrant.1 30 Without discussing whether CBS acted under
color of state law, the district court concluded that CBS violated a
icant aid from state officials"; or (3) a party whose conduct is "otherwise
chargeable to the state." Id.
127. See, e.g., Parker I, 905 F. Supp. at 642. A common standard used in apply-
ing the second prong of the Lugar test is whether the private party willfully partici-
pated in joint activity with the state or state agents - the same standard used in
Adickes. See id. For a discussion of Adickes, see supra notes 119-20 and accompany-
ing text.
128. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942. As for the first prong, the Court concluded
that since the attachment procedure was authorized by a Virginia statute, the at-
tachment procedure was an exercise of rights having their source in state author-
ity, meeting the requirements of the first prong. See id. at 941. As for the second
prong, the Court concluded that Edmondson's use of the court to execute the
attachment procedures was 'joint activity" as referred to in Adickes, making Ed-
mondson a "state actor." See id.
129. 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), afffd, Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d
Cir. 1994). For a general discussion of Ayeni I, see supra notes 87-94 and accompa-
nying text.
130. See Ayeni I, 848 F. Supp. at 367-68. In this precursor to Ayeni II, the plain-
tiff filed a § 1983 claim against CBS for filming the execution of a search warrant
in their apartment and broadcasting the tapes on a weekly television news program
called "Street Stories." See id. at 364-65. The Ayenis contended that CBS formed
an agreement with the Secret Service and entered the Ayenis' apartment with im-
plied permission and consent of the Secret Service. See id. at 365. The plaintiffs'
complaint stated in part: "CBS also claims to have accompanied the Secret Service
furthering the execution of the search of the plaintiffs' apartment under the im-
primatur of the official warrant and through the auspices of its 'confidential in-
formant,' one of the Unknown Special Agents [sic] who participated in the search
of the Ayeni apartment." Id. While these allegations support a claim that CBS
acted under color of state law, it is not clear whether the district court concluded
that CBS acted under color of state law or whether they even considered it neces-
sary to make such a determination. For a complete discussion of the facts in Ayeni
I, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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clearly established Fourth Amendment right and denied CBS quali-
fied immunity since it was not a government official.131
In Berger v. Cable News Network, Inc.,13 2 the United States District
Court of Montana, Billings Division, considered whether CNN was
liable under § 1983 for accompanying federal agents during the
search of the plaintiffs' ranch and later broadcasting a news story
featuring footage from the search.1 33 The district court dismissed
the Fourth Amendment claim against CNN, finding that the issue
was previously litigated in the criminal case against Berger, 34 and
that CNN was not acting under color of state law. 135 According to
the district court, a private party such as CNN does not act under
color of state law when the party is present during a search for its
own purposes.13 6
IV. NARRAlIvE ANALYSIs
A. Qualified Immunity of Police Officers
In Parker II, the Eighth Circuit considered the relevant law that
existed at the time the St. Louis police officers executed their
search of the Parkers' residence. 137 The majority observed that
131. See Ayeni I, 848 F. Supp. at 367-68. In denying qualified immunity to
CBS, the district court reasoned that "qualified immunity. . . acts to safeguard the
government, and thereby to protect the public at large, not to benefit its agents."
Id. (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168 (1992)). Since CBS was a private
corporation, as opposed to a government official, CBS was not entitled to qualified
immunity. See id. at 368. The district court further concluded that even if CBS
were a government official, qualified immunity would be denied since CBS and the
Secret Service agents violated a clearly established Constitutional right. See id. Af-
ter the district court's ruling, CBS and the Ayenis arrived at a confidential settle-
ment, and Secret Service Agent James Mottola was the sole defendant on appeal.
See Ayeni II, 35 F.3d at 684 n.2. For a discussion of Ayeni II, see supra notes 87-94
and accompanying text.
132. Berger v. CNN, No. CV 94-46-BLG-JDS, 1996 WL 390528 (D. Mont.
1996).
133. See id. at *1. The plaintiffs' claims against CNN arise out of the same set
of facts as those in Berger v. Hanlon, No. CV 94-46-BLG-JDS, 1996 WL 376364 (D.
Mont. Feb. 26, 1996), modified, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of
the factual background of both cases, see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
134. United States v. Berger, CR 93-46-BLG-RWA (D. Mont. 1983). The dis-
trict court found that since the Constitutionality of the search had already been
litigated, the causes of action based on the Constitutionality of the search were
barred by collateral estoppel. See Berger v. CNN, 1996 WL 390528, at *2.
135. See id. at *3.
136. See id. (citing United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657-58 (9th Cir.
1982); United States v. Jennings, 653 F.2d 107, 110 (4th Cir. 1981)).
137. Parker II, 93 F.3d at 447. The majority noted that "[iun assessing claims
of qualified immunity, we are of course required to examine the state of the rele-
vant law at the time the officials committed the acts of which the plaintiffs com-
plain." Id.
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there was no available case on point, and that the Supreme Court
had not provided any guidance as to whether it was reasonable for
police officers to allow a television crew to enter a house during the
execution of a search warrant. 138 The majority noted Ayeni II3 9
and Buonocore v. Harris,140 but declined to apply these cases since
they were rendered after the search at issue in Parker I.14 In addi-
tion, the majority stated that even if the holdings in Ayeni II and
Buonocore were applicable, the decisions indicate "at most only the
beginnings of a trend in the law. 1 42 The majority also declined to
find it self-evident that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when
police officers invite members of the news media to enter a home
during the execution of a search warrant.143 Based on its findings,
the majority concluded that the police's conduct did not violate a
clearly established Constitutional right of which they should have
been aware at the time the search warrant was executed. 144
B. "Color of State Law" Requirement Applied to KSDK
In considering the § 1983 claims against KSDK, the majority
applied the traditional definition of "color of state law."1 45 The ma-
jority also applied the first prong of the two-part test introduced in
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.146 According to the majority, the
Parkers alleged only that KSDK exercised a right or privilege cre-
ated by the state, which is only one attribute of the first prong of
138. See id.
139. 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
140. 65 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 1995).
141. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 447.
142. Id. The majority's characterization of these decisions as "beginnings of a
trend" is presumed to mean that the decisions are far from being "clearly estab-
lished" law. This characterization has led other circuit courts to doubt the force of
the Second Circuit's conclusion in Ayeni I. See Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159, 162-63
(6th Cir. 1996) (citing both Ayeni II and Parker I).
143. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 447.
144. See id. Therefore, the majority found that the district court had erred in
finding that the police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity, and re-
versed the judgment against the officers. See id.
145. See id. at 447-48. This definition, which conveys a narrow interpretation
of "color of state law," states that the defendant charged with the § 1983 claim
must have exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." Id. at 447-48
(quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
146. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 448. According to the first prong of the Lugar
test, the cause of the alleged injury must be attributed to: 1) an exercise of some
state-created right or privilege; 2) a rule of conduct imposed by the state; or 3) a
person for whom the state bears responsibility. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
1998]
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the Lugar test.147 Based on this assumption, the majority concluded
that KSDK did not act under color of state law as alleged by the
Parkers for two reasons: (1) the KSDK crew's acts were committed
separately from the officers' exercise of privileges under state law;
and (2) the rights that KSDK exercised in entering the Parker's
home were not created by the state.148
C. Concurring Opinion
District Judge Rosenbaum, concurring specially, wrote sepa-
rately to emphasize the need to first determine whether the plain-
tiffs' claimed Constitutional right existed at all. 149 Once the
Constitutional right has been identified, the court can then assess
whether that right was clearly established law at the time the facts of
the case took place.' 50 In discussing the first step, Judge Rosen-
baum concluded, contrary to the majority opinion, that police offi-
cials violate Fourth Amendment rights when they allow television
crews into a private home during a search without the resident's
express consent.15 1 This conclusion, as Judge Rosenbaum noted,
was consistent with the Second Circuit's decision in Ayeni 11.152 Af-
ter recognizing the Constitutional right, Judge Rosenbaum agreed
with the majority that the St. Louis police officers did not violate a
Constitutional right which was clearly established at the time the
officers admitted the KSDK news crew into the Parkers' home. 53
147. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 448.
148. See id. According to the majority, KSDK clearly acted independently of
the police in deciding to enter the house and videotape the search. See id. In
support of this, the majority noted that KSDK did not assist the police in executing
the search, and the police did not assist KSDK in recording the search. See id. The
majority explained that "jt]he television station was [present] for reasons of its
own and was engaged in a mission entirely distinct from the one that brought the
police to the house." Id. The majority sided with the district court in concluding
that "[a]t most, KSDK's acts were committed parallel to and contemporaneous
with the police officers' exercise of privileges under state law in the execution of a
lawfully obtained search warrant." Parker II, 93 F.3d at 448 (quoting district court
in Parker I, 905 F. Supp. at 642).
149. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 448 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). District Judge
Rosenbaum stated, "[i]n my view, our jurisprudence demands a first determina-
tion of whether the claimed Constitutional right, in fact, exists. [The majority has]
missed this required first step in the qualified immunity analysis." Id. District
Judge Rosenbaum further stated, "It is not until we have made this required deci-




152. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 448.
153. See id. Although Judge Rosenbaum did not express any reasons for con-
cluding that the Constitutional right was not clearly established at the time the
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D. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold dis-
agreed with the majority's conclusion that KSDK's employees did
not act "under color of state law" for § 1983 purposes. 15 4 Contrary
to the majority, Judge Arnold subscribed to the broader interpreta-
tion of "color of state law" introduced in Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co.,155 noting that the KSDK employees were willful participants in
joint activity with the St. Louis Police Department.1 56
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The majority's analyses of the qualified immunity issue and the
"color of state law" requirement do not reflect careful considera-
tion of prior case law. Some parts of the majority's analysis fail to
conform to binding Supreme Court decisions that address how to
apply qualified immunity and interpret the "color of state law" re-
quirement. 157 As a result, the majority's analyses of these two areas
of the law are difficult to reconcile with relevant precedent.
A. Qualified Immunity to Police Officers
The majority's analysis of the qualified immunity issue is ques-
tionable in two major respects. First, the majority's assessment of
preexisting law fails to look at relevant case law that implicitly estab-
lishes the unlawfulness of the St. Louis police officers' conduct (as
opposed to expressly holding that such conduct is unlawful).158
Second, the majority opinion overlooks clearly established Constitu-
tional principles in declaring that the unlawfulness of the police
officers' conduct was not self-evident. 15 9 This conclusion ignores
well known principles that the Fourth Amendment limits searches
officers searched the Parker residence, it is likely that his concurring opinion was
based on the same reasons set forth by the majority. See id.
154. See id. (Arnold C.J., concurring in part/dissenting in part).
155. 398 U.S. 144 (1970). For a discussion of the broad interpretation of
"color of state law" laid out in Adickes, see supra notes 119-20 and accompanying
text.
156. See Parker 11, 93 F.3d at 449 (quoting Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152). Judge
Arnold stated, "[i]n my view, the news crew acted in concert with the police in
entering the Parkers' home." Id. Judge Arnold pointed out that the news crew
arrived at the Parkers' residence with police, and the news crew could not have
been able to enter the Parkers' house if police had not entered first. See id. Judge
Arnold noted that "[the KSDK team] did not simply happen along the street at the
time that a search was being conducted." Id.
157. See infra notes 163 and 180 and accompanying text.
158. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
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to the scope set forth in a warrant and that the Fourth Amendment
requires officers to minimize the extent of their intrusions into
homes. 160
1. Assessment of Preexisting Law
In granting qualified immunity to the St. Louis police officers,
the majority improperly examined the relevant law which was avail-
able at the time of the search. The majority examined Ayeni II and
Buonocore and concluded that neither case was applicable since the
cases were decided after the facts in Parker II took place.1 61 This
decision ignores the fact that while Ayeni II was decided after the
search of the Parkers' residence, Ayeni I merely applied other rele-
vant law which was established at the time the Parkers' residence
was searched.' 6 2
By limiting their discussion to cases like Ayeni II and Buonocore,
the majority apparently looked only for cases which expressly hold
that the conduct in question is unlawful. This ignores the true stan-
dard to defeat qualified immunity set forth by the Supreme Court
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.16 3 According to the Court in Harlow, the test
to defeat qualified immunity for § 1983 purposes requires that the
unlawfulness of the act be apparent to the police officers at the
time they acted, in light of preexisting law.164 In order to deny
qualified immunity to police officers, courts do not have to locate
160. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
161. See Parker 11, 93 F.3d at 447.
162. See Ayeni II, 35 F.3d 680, 685 (2d Cir. 1994). For example, the Second
Circuit in Ayeni II discussed the Fourth Amendment objectives which sought to
preserve the right to privacy in the home to the maximum extent. See id. The text
of the Fourth Amendment expressly requires that all police searches must be rea-
sonable. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has interpreted the "rea-
sonableness" requirement as a means to ensure reasonableness in the manner and
scope of searches that are carried out. See Ayeni II, 35 F.3d at 687 (citing Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985)).
In addition, the Second Circuit discussed the significance of 18 U.S.C. § 3105 in
assessing the reasonableness of police conduct. See Ayeni II, 35 F.3d at 687.
Although the decision in Ayeni Hwas not available, the legal precedents underlying
the Ayeni II decision were available at the time St. Louis police acted.
Unlike the majority in Parker II, the district court in Parker I showed a more
careful consideration of Ayeni I. While the majority in the Eighth Circuit focused
only on the date of the Ayeni Ildecision, the district court looked beyond the date
of the decision to examine the rationale and conclusions asserted by the Second
Circuit. See Parker 1, 905 F. Supp. 638, 643 (1995). Since the rationale and conclu-
sions were based on Constitutional and statutory principles in existence long
before the facts in Parker II, the district court was justified in considering them
during its treatment of the qualified immunity issue.
163. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For a discussion of the standard set forth in
Harlow, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
164. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
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case law that expressly holds the officers' conduct to be unlawful.1 6 5
Therefore, the majority failed to apply the proper standard to de-
feat qualified immunity.
2. Self-evident Violations of Fourth Amendment Principles
The majority found that it is not self-evident that police violate
Fourth Amendment principles when they allow the media to ac-
company the execution of a search warrant.166 This is problematic,
since police conduct which exceeds the express limits of a search
warrant clearly violates Fourth Amendment principles.1 67 Given
the Fourth Amendment limitation on unreasonable searches, the
unreasonableness of allowing a television crew to enter a suspect's
home during the execution of a search warrant without any type of
authorization is self-evident. 168 As in Ayeni II, neither the police nor
KSDK provided any justification for the presence of television cam-
eras in the Parker residence during the search. 169 Intrusions such
as this must be justified by a governmental interest that outweighs
165. See id. Throughout their analysis, the majority failed to make any assess-
ment as to the apparent unlawfulness of the officers' conduct in light of Fourth
Amendment principles and statutory laws that were available to the officers. See id.
166. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 447.
167. See Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, 356 (4th Cir. 1995). According to
the Fourth Circuit, law enforcement officers who invite individuals not authorized
in the search warrant to accompany the officers during the search clearly exceed
the scope of the warrant. See id. Based on common law which dates back to the
framing of the Constitution and Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment since that time, the Fourth Amendment clearly prohibits police con-
duct which exceeds the scope of the warrant. See id. "A search warrant circum-
scribes the right to search. If the search exceeds the scope of the search warrant
then the search becomes unreasonable." Id. at 359.
168. See Hagler v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., No. CIV.A. 96-2154, 1996
WL 408605, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 1996). Senior District Judge Vanartsdalen's
opinion in Hagler expressed the obvious Fourth Amendment violations that occur
when police officers allow newspaper reporters and cameras to be present during a
search. See id. In denying qualified immunity to police officers who allowed news-
paper personnel to witness a search, Judge Vanartsdalen explained:
It should have been obvious to the officers.., that a warrant issued only
in the name of the officers, for the limited purpose of searching for nar-
cotics, did not authorize them to allow members of the media to enter a
private home. A reasonable person would know that the purpose of a
warrant is to facilitate proper law-enforcement, not to provide a "photo
opportunity." A search warrant is simply not a press pass.
Id. See also Antonio Yanez, Jr., Ayeni v. Mottola and the Implications of Characterizing
Videotaping as a Fourth Amendment Seizure, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 507, 532 (1995) (stat-
ing that warrantless entry into home, without more, is universally held to be unrea-
sonable per se).
169. See Yanez, supra note 168, at 532 (emphasizing that no justification was
given for presence of television cameras in Ayeni Hand that it was difficult to imag-
ine circumstances where presence of television cameras would be justified).
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the reasonable expectations of privacy in the home. 170 Since the St.
Louis Police Department did not assert any governmental interest
in allowing KSDK to film the search, the Department's actions, like
the government's actions in Ayeni II, were violations of the Fourth
Amendment.171
The Supreme Court has stated that searches must be con-
ducted "in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon
privacy." 172 Accordingly, officers who serve a search warrant have
little discretion regarding the scope and nature of the search, and
they must strictly obey the terms of the warrant. 173 In Parker II,
KSDK personnel were not authorized to be present by the search
warrant, and the police did not impose any limitations on their con-
duct.1 74 Consequently, the police officers failed to minimize intru-
sions upon the Parkers' privacy, and in doing so violated general
Fourth Amendment principles.
B. "Color of State Law" Analysis
In addressing the § 1983 claims against the KSDK personnel,
the majority made questionable conclusions of law and fact. First,
the majority began with an incomplete application of the Lugar test,
leaving out important components of the test which are pertinent
to the analysis of KSDK's actions.1 75 Second, the majority drew a
questionable conclusion that KSDK personnel acted independently
of the police, notwithstanding facts which indicate that police and
KSDK personnel collaborated before and during the search. 176
Third, the majority characterized KSDK's conduct as an ordinary
trespass as opposed to an exercise of a state-created right, which is
170. See id. Police officers violate the public's trust when they invite private
parties along during a search while being fully aware that those parties serve no
role in carrying out the search. See United States v. Sansusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 160-
61 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). In allowing the media to enter homes during searches, police
officers disregard the important values that are threatened any time the govern-
ment enters a private person's home. See id.
171. SeeYanez, supra note 168, at 532 (noting that government agents in Ayeni
1I provided no governmental interest which would be served by allowing CBS to
film search of Ayeni's home).
172. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.ll (1976).
173. See Kevin E. Lunday, Permitting Media Participation in Federal Searches: Ex-
ploring the Consequences for the United States folowing Ayeni v. Mottola and a Framework
for Analysis, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 278, 306 (1997).
174. See Parker II, 93 F.3d 445, 447 (8th Cir. 1996).
175. See infra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
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questionable in light of the police department's policy of prevent-
ing trespassing and intrusions during searches. 177
1. Misapplication of the Lugar Test
The majority's conclusion that KSDK personnel did not act
under color of state law was reached through improper analysis.
First, the majority's application of the first prong from Lugar v. Ed-
mondson Oil Co. was incomplete.178 In its analysis under the first
prong, the majority assumed that the plaintiffs only alleged that
KSDK exercised a right or privilege created by the state in entering
the house.1 79 In doing so, the majority ignored other components
of the first prong which may be used to determine whether the
party acted under color of state law.180 The last part of the first
prong plainly states that the alleged violation must be caused by the
exercise of some privilege created by a "person for whom the state
is responsible."18 1 Looking to the facts in Parker II, it is clear that
the St. Louis Police Department, for whom the state was responsi-
ble, often allowed members of the news and television industry to
accompany them during the execution of search warrants. 8 2 As
the district court found, the St. Louis Police Department allowed
KSDK personnel to accompany Officers Rodney Boyer and Dan
Dell as they executed the search warrant at the Parker residence.'8 3
Therefore, KSDK personnel exercised a privilege that was created
by individuals for whom the state was responsible.' 8 4 This conduct
177. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
178. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 448. For a discussion of the two-part test intro-
duced in Lugar, see supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
179. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 448. The majority quickly disposed of this claim,
finding that KSDK acted independently of the police and entered the Parkers'
house for its own reasons with no authority from the state. See id.
180. See id. For a discussion of the requirements set forth in the first prong of
the Lugar test, see supra note 125.
181. Parker II, 93 F.3d at 448. It should be clarified that the first prong in
Lugar imposes no requirements as to who the "actor" must be; rather, the first
prong only requires that the alleged violation be caused by the exercise of a right
or privilege which originates from the state in one of three ways. See Lugar, 457
U.S. at 937. Therefore, the actor could be a state actor, or, as in Parker I, the actor
could be a private entity. For a discussion of the requirements set forth in the first
prong of the Lugar test, see supra note 125.
182. See Parker I, 905 F. Supp. at 641. In his deposition, Police Chief Harmon
testified that the department screens requests by the media to accompany officers
during their shifts. See id. In evaluating requests, Chief Harmon testified that he
focused on physical safety issues, potential for interference in police activity, sub-
ject matter of the media report and the potential effect the report may have on the
public's perception of police officers. See id.
183. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 446-47.
184. See id. at 446.
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clearly caused the injury claimed by the Parkers, as KSDK would not
have entered the Parkers' home but for the police department's
invitation. Therefore, the first prong of the Lugar test was satisfied.
The majority did not consider the second prong of the Lugar
test in its analysis.' 8 5 From the clear language of the second prong,
private parties are considered state actors if they have acted to-
gether with or have obtained significant aid from state officials. 186
Looking to the facts of Parker II, KSDK acted together with police
officers in entering the home. 8 7 In addition, the St. Louis police
officers provided significant aid to KSDK personnel, first by inform-
ing KSDK about the Parker search, and then by providing transpor-
tation and access to the Parkers' residence. 8 8 Therefore, thorough
consideration of the Lugar test indicates that KSDK personnel were
acting under color of state law for § 1983 purposes. The majority's
conclusion that KSDK did not act under color of state law is not
supported by proper application of the Lugar test.
2. Characterization of KSDK Crew as "Independent Actors"
The majority stressed that KSDK acted independently from the
St. Louis Police Department, rather than in conjunction with
them. 8 9 In making this determination, the majority noted that the
185. The second prong of the Lugar test states:
[T]he party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official,
because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state
officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the state.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (emphasis added).
186. See id.
187. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 447. Judge Richard S. Arnold, in his dissent,
pointed out that the news crew came to the Parker residence with police and could
not have entered if the police had not done so first. See id. at 449 (Arnold, J.,
dissenting). Although KSDK personnel and the police were engaged in separate
activities after entering the house, Judge Arnold concluded that the KSDK news
crew acted in concert with the police when they entered the house. See id.
188. See id. at 446-47. Based on the district court's findings of fact, the police
department contacted the KSDK reporter and informed him of a weapons investi-
gation that was in progress. See id. at 446. Sgt. Risk made arrangements to have
Officer Boyer take the KSDK personnel along during his shift. See ParkerII, 93 F.3d
at 446. Officer Boyer and Officer Dell subsequently drove the KSDK personnel to
the scene. See id. Once at the scene, the officers detained the suspect Martin so as
to facilitate the officers' and camera crew's safe access into the house. See id. at
446-47.
189. See id. at 448. According to the majority, KSDK acted independently of
the police when they entered the house and recorded the search. See id. The
majority found that KSDK and the police did not assist each other as they per-
formed their separate tasks. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 448. The television station
acted for reasons of its own and was not engaged in the mission which brought the
police to the house. See id.
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KSDK personnel and police officers entered the Parker residence
for their own purposes.19 ° In addition, the majority noted that the
police officers and KSDK personnel did not enter the Parker resi-
dence at the same time.1 91 This reasoning is unpersuasive in two
respects. First, the distinction between KSDK's motives and the po-
lice department's motives in entering the residence has no bearing
on whether KSDK exercised a privilege created by persons for
whom the state is responsible. Second, the majority's analysis of the
facts is narrowly aimed at events occurring after the parties entered
the house and ignores the events leading up to the search. The
alleged violation of the Parkers' rights was manifested not only in
the parties' conduct in the home, but also the parties' collaborative
planning prior to the search which made the subsequent events
possible. 192
3. Characterizing KSDK's Conduct as a Trespass
The majority chose to characterize KSDK's conduct as
"[s] eizing an opportunity to trespass" rather than "invoking a right
or privilege" created by a state agent. 193 There are problems with
characterizing KSDK's conduct as a trespass. First, it is difficult to
believe that police officers would not stop a blatant trespasser, with
whom they have no association, from roaming through a suspect's
residence during a search.' 94 More importantly, some element of
190. See id. According to the majority, each party was engaged "in the per-
formance of their separate and respective tasks." Id. (emphasis added). The televi-
sion station was present "for reasons of its own and was engaged in a mission entirely
distinct from the one that brought the police to the house." Id. (emphasis added).
191. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 448. The majority pointed out that the KSDK
personnel entered the Parkers' house after the police did. See id.
192. For a discussion of the planning done between the police and KSDK, see
supra note 188 and accompanying text. As previously stated, this collaboration in-
cluded the police department's act of notifying the KSDK reporter, Sgt. Risk's ef-
forts in arranging the ride-along and Officer Boyer's act of driving the KSDK
personnel to the scene. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 446.
193. Id. at 448.
194. See Parker I, 905 F. Supp. at 638. According to testimony from Police
Chief Harmon and Lieutenant Joseph Richardson of the St. Louis Police Depart-
ment, it is not likely that the police officers at the Parker residence would have
tolerated the presence of a trespasser during the execution of a search warrant. See
id. In Chief Harmon's view, the media personnel are responsible for obtaining
permission from the citizen prior to entering the citizen's home and filming the
search. See id. If the media personnel fail to obtain permission, the supervising
officer on the scene is instructed to bar the media from entering the residence, on
the ground that such entry without the resident's permission would constitute a
trespass. See id. Lieutenant Richardson testified that it was his policy to bar the
media from a suspect's residence unless the crime scene was secure and the media
had obtained permission from those involved. See id. As stated earlier, KSDK did
not obtain any permission from the Parkers prior to entering the residence and
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state authorization for KSDK's conduct must have existed when
KSDK entered the Parkers' home and recorded the search.195 For
these reasons, the majority's characterization of KSDK's conduct as
a mere trespass is questionable.
VI. IMPACT
By addressing Fourth Amendment claims against police of-
ficers and the media, Parker H has influenced rules of conduct for
both law enforcement officials and media representatives. This Sec-
tion will address the relative impact Parker II has on each of these
groups.
A. Impact on Law Enforcement Officials
In Parker II, Judge Arnold analyzed the officers' conduct and
found that Fourth Amendment violations were neither self-evident
nor apparent through clearly established principles that reasonable
police officers should know. 196 Although the St. Louis police of-
ficers were given qualified immunity, the majority's decision is un-
likely to affect future lawsuits against police officers who permit
media representatives to accompany them during searches. First,
Judge Arnold's view that Ayeni Hand Buonocore are "beginnings of a
trend in the law," as opposed to sources of clearly established law, is
not likely to be shared by other circuits.' 9 7 Second, fewer cases will
filming the search. See Parker 1, 905 F. Supp. at 641. Nor do the facts indicate that
the police officers had reason to believe that KSDK had secured permission to
enter. See id. Although a number of officers from the St. Louis Police Department
were involved in the execution of the search warrant, none of the officers directed
the KSDK personnel to leave. See id. Given the department's policy on trespassers,
the facts above do not support a finding that the police viewed the KSDK crew as
mere trespassers.
195. See Kevin E. Lunday, Permitting Media Participation in Federal Searches: Ex-
ploring the Consequences for the United States following Ayeni v. Mottola and a Framework
for Analysis, 65 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 278, 303 (discussing additional authorization
media must obtain in order to access private areas). While the media may enjoy
certain privileges in accessing areas where an ordinary citizen may not be author-
ized to enter, the media does not enjoy a privilege to conduct illegal activity, such
as intruding upon the privacy of the home. See id. When media personnel enter an
area for the purpose of gathering news, they do so under a traditional color of
public access. See id. When the media enters private homes during searches that
trigger the Fourth Amendment, the nature of their access is no longer "public" but
rather "governmental." See id. Thus, when the media enters a private home dur-
ing the execution of a search warrant, it does so under the color of state law en-
forcement authority. See id.
196. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 447. For a discussion of the majority's analysis,
see supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
197. In Hanlon II, decided only a year after Parker II, the majority relied al-
most exclusively on Ayeni II and Buonocore to conclude that a residential search
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involve searches taking place before the Ayeni II and Buonocore deci-
sions; thus, more courts will have to account for Ayeni II and Buo-
nocore when they determine the relevant law during the time of the
search. 198
The concurring opinion in Parker II will likely have more of an
impact on police conduct than Judge Arnold's opinion. In his con-
curring opinion, Judge Rosenbaum disagreed with Judge Arnold
and found that police officers violate a person's Fourth Amend-
ment rights when they admit media representatives into the per-
son's home during the execution of a search warrant. 199 In
concluding that such searches are unconstitutional, Judge Rosen-
baum's opinion has reinforced the Ayeni II and Buonocore decisions
as clearly established law and will likely dispel Judge Arnold's no-
tion that they are merely beginnings of a trend.200 Consequently,
Judge Rosenbaum's concurring opinion strongly supports Ayeni II
and will discourage police officers from permitting the presence of
media representatives during searches.
B. Impact on the Media
The majority's analysis of the "color of state law" requirement
will prolong the confusion which surrounds the analysis of § 1983
claims against private parties like the media. As previously stated,
the Supreme Court has appeared inconsistent in how it determines
whether a party acts "under color of state law."20 1 The most recent
of these tests, which perhaps was aimed at clearing up these incon-
videotaped by television cameras is unreasonable and therefore in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. See Hanlon II, 129 F.3d 505, 511 (9th Cir. 1997). Therefore,
the majority in Hanlon II did not share Judge Arnold's view, finding Ayeni I and
Buonocore to represent clearly established law. See id.
198. In Parker II, Judge Arnold noted, "Because both Ayeni [II] and Buo-
nocore were decided after the police in this case executed their search, those cases
cannot weigh in the balance against a finding of qualified immunity." Parker I, 93
F.3d at 447. As time passes, fewer and fewer courts will have the opportunity to
discount the holdings in Ayeni II and Buonocore for the reason Judge Arnold
provided.
199. See id. at 448. For a discussion of Judge Rosenbaum's concurring opin-
ion, see supra notes 149-53.
200. In support of Ayeni II, Judge Rosenbaum concluded, "I would find, con-
sistent with Ayeni [II], that police officials executing a search warrant violate a
resident's Fourth Amendment rights, when they admit representatives of the pub-
lic media into a private citizen's home, without first securing the resident's express
consent." Parker II, 93 F.3d at 448. Judge Rosenbaum's concurring opinion has
already been followed by other circuits. See Hanlon II, 129 F.3d 505, 511-12 (citing
Rosenbaum's separate opinion in Parker H to support view that media presence
during execution of search warrants is unconstitutional).
201. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
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sistencies, is the two-prong test in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 202 In-
stead of applying the Lugar two-prong test, the majority made
scattered references to an earlier test articulated in United States v.
Classic, as well as pieces of the first prong in Lugar.20 3 This analysis
distorts the systematic approach the Supreme Court set forth in
Lugar, and it may incline other circuits to use the same "cut-and-
paste" application of different tests rather than apply the complete
test set forth in Lugar.20 4 As a result, the process for determining
whether private actors such as television crews are actors under
color of state law will remain spotty and inconsistent.20 5
As a result of this inconsistency in analysis, the majority opin-
ion's impact on the media is unclear. In addition, the commercial
success of reality programming makes the significance of Parker I
even less certain. Lawsuits will not discourage producers of reality
programs from continuing to film police searches of homes if the
profits they earn exceed settlements to § 1983 claims. 20 6 In the
end, the settlements andjudgments that networks pay each year are
just a cost of doing business, which is currently justified by the reve-
nue the programs generate.20 7
Christopher A. Rothe
202. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
203. See Parker II, 93 F.3d at 447-48. The majority began its discussion of the
"color of state law" requirement by referring to the traditional definition set forth
in Classic. See id. Without any further discussion of Classic, the majority jumped to
the first prong of the Lugar test, which is considerably broader than the Classic
standard. See id. at 448. The majority then focused on a section of text contained
within the first prong and applied it to the facts of the case without considering the
remaining language in the first prong. See id.
204. See supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
205. For a discussion of Supreme Court's decision to develop more consistent
analysis of the "color of state law" requirement, see supra notes 115-24 and accom-
panying text.
206. See Symposium, Current Issues in Media and Telecommunications Law -Panel
I: Accountability of the Media in Investigations, 7 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 401 (1997). Commentators note that while networks may incur costly settle-
ments for producing programs in violation of individuals' rights, the money
earned in selling the programs and running advertisements during the programs
more than makes up for the money lost in settlements. See id.
207. See id.
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